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I. Increasing Importance of State and Local Taxes
A. Increasing State Tax Burden
1. With increasing cutbacks at the federal level and
the cost of more programs being mandated to local
government, the revenue needs of state and local
governments are increasing rapidly. State tax
revenues increased $15 billion in fiscal 1992, the
largest state tax increase ever, and a total of
$24 billion in the last two years. Coopers &
Lybrand, State and Local Taxes: The Burden Grows
(1992) (Report on C&L's 1992 Business Survey:
citing the National Governors Association and the
Association of State Budget Officers).
2. State and local tax issues are often the "deal
breaker" when federal tax issues are closely
negotiated. Even in relatively low tax states in
the Southeast, the aggregation of income taxes,
sales and use taxes, license taxes, recordation
and other privilege taxes can represent a swing of
13% or more in the total value of a deal.
3. State and local tax collectors are becoming
increasingly aggressive. Audits are more
frequent. Audit positions are more aggressive.
B. Active Supreme Court Term
1. The United States Supreme Court's 1991--92 Term
was one of the most active in recent years in
terms of state and local taxes. For one of the
first times in modern history, state tax
developments may have overshadowed developments at
the federal level.
2. In the month before this outline was prepared, the
United States Supreme Court handed down six major
state tax decisions. Not only do these cases
decide important particular issues, the Court's
analysis provides important insights into the
resolution of on-going issues, particularly in the
income tax area.
II. Background: The Judicial Revolution
A. Formalism in Taxing Interstate Commerce
1. Prior to 1977, the case law concerning taxation of
interstate commerce was confusing, at best. The
Court's "negative" or "dormant" Commerce Clause
analysis had evolved substantially over 200 years
from a complete prohibition against taxing
interstate commerce in any form, to permitting
"indirect" but not "direct" taxes on interstate
commerce, to an analysis of whether taxes imposed
"multiple tax burdens." See Quill Corporation v.
North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 60 U.S.L.W. 4423
(1992) (summarizing history of Court's analysis
under both Due Process and Commerce Clauses).
2. The Court focused on whether a tax was on the
"privilege" of doing interstate business; the
result often turned on how a tax was named and not
on its economic effects. "Magic words or labels"
were critical. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 441 (1959).
B. Interstate Commerce: Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady
1. The Court retreated from a formalistic analysis of
interstate commerce tax issues in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
There, the taxpayer was engaged in the purely
interstate business of transporting motor vehicles
from out-of-state manufacturers to dealers in
Mississippi. A similar tax had been held
unconstitutional in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
O'Conner. 340 U.S. 602 (1951) because it was
imposed on "the privilege of doing interstate
business."
2. In upholding Mississippi's fairly apportioned tax
on this interstate transportation business, the
Court announced its now famous four part test. A
tax will be sustained against Commerce Clause
challenge so long as:
[T]he tax [1] is applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing
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State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3]
does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to
the services provided by the State.
430 U.S. at 279. This test substitutes a more
pragmatic, substantive approach for the
formalistic standards previously applied by the
Court. Spector was overruled. 430 U.S. at 282.
C. Foreign Commerce: Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles
1. Two years after Complete Auto, the United States
Supreme Court announced a similar analysis under
the Foreign Commerce Clause. In Japan Line,
Limited v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434
(1979), the Court considered the constitutionality
of a fairly apportioned property tax on foreign
owned container vessels used exclusively in
foreign commerce.
2. In Japan Line the Court held that "[w]hen
construing Congress' power to 'regulate commerce
with foreign Nations,' a more extensive
constitutional inquiry is required." 441 U.S. at
446. To the four tests announced in Complete Auto
for analyzing issues under the Commerce Clause,
the Court added two new considerations for Foreign
Commerce Clause cases:
In addition to answering the nexus,
apportionment and nondiscrimination
questions posed in Compete Auto, a court
must also inquire, first, whether the
tax, notwithstanding apportionment,
creates a substantial risk of
international multiple taxation, and,
second, whether the tax prevents the
Federal Government from "speaking with
one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments."
441 U.S. at 451 (italics supplied). Although Los
Angeles' apportioned property tax passed muster
under Commerce Clause analysis, it fell short
under the Foreign Commerce Clause because the
cargo containers were subject to multiple
international taxation under various treaties
between Japan and the United States.
II. Nexus to Tax: Who Must Pay
A. Sales and Use Taxes: Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
1. Most states' sales and use tax laws follow a
similar pattern. Retail transactions are
subjected to a "sales tax" which the retail
merchant is required to collect and remit to the
state. To prevent circumvention of the tax, there
is a "compensating use tax" generally applicable
whenever the sales tax is not imposed. Except for
large businesses, use tax audits are not a
practical enforcement tool. Thus, collection of
this major revenue source is heavily dependent
upon cooperation of the retail merchant, the
state's tax collection agent.
2. Supreme Court decisions generally required some
sort of physical presence in the taxing state
before the retail merchant could be required to
act as the state's collection agent.
a. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960),
upholding collection of state's use tax based
on presence in taxing state of independent
contractor soliciting orders.
b. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967),
overturning state's attempt to require mail-
order house to collect use tax on goods
purchased by customers in-state. Mail-order
house had no stores or sales representatives
in the taxing state. A "seller whose only
connection with customers in the State is by
common carrier or the United States mail"
cannot be required to collect the state's tax
under both the Commerce Clause and Due
Process Clause. Id. at 758.
c. National Geographic Society v. California
Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
Magazine publisher required to collect tax on
its mail-order subscriptions based on
presence in taxing state of two offices for
soliciting advertisements.
d. D.H. Holmes Co. Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24
(1988), upholding Louisiana use tax on value
of catalogues distributed by mail to
customers in state where retailer had
numerous stores, employees, etc. in
Louisiana.
-4-
111. Nexus to Tax: Who Must Pay
3. With the more pragmatic, substantive approach
signaled by Complete Auto, states saw the
opportunity to eliminate the ever expanding mail
order "loophole." Anticipating reversal of the
"no physical presence" test in Bellas Hess, many
state statutes were expanded to increase tax
collection responsibilities for out-of-state
sellers. For example:
a. Virginia Code § 58.1-613 was amended to treat
the following activities as creating taxable
nexus:
(i) Advertise through materials distributed
in Virginia other than by U.S. mail.
(ii) Solicit business systematically in
Virginia by advertising broadcast or
relayed from a transmitter located in
Virginia.
(iii) Solicit business through mail with the
benefit of any banking, financing, or
marketing activities in Virginia (e.g.,
credit cards).
b. Georgia Code Annotated § 48-8-2(H) was
amended to include with the term "Dealer"
responsible for collecting the sales tax, one
who:
(H) Solicits business by
representatives or engages in the
regular or systematic solicitation
of a consumer market in this state
by the distribution of catalogs,
periodicals, advertising fliers, or
other advertising, or by means of
print, radio, or television media,
by telegraphy, telephone, computer
data base, cable optic, microwave
or other communication system.
4. This particular constitutional issue made for
peculiar bedfellows. On the one hand, the mail-
order industry fought hard to preserve its
competitive advantage and to avoid what it
perceived as the nightmare of attempting to
collect sales and use taxes in thousands of
separate jurisdictions throughout the United
States. It was often joined, for example, by
small manufacturing and other businesses selling
by catalogue or otherwise through interstate
deliveries. Frequently aligned with the states
were national retailers and established local
businesses who were losing sales to the "tax free"
mail-order industry. The cases were divided:
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a. SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585
A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991) (mail-order subsidiary
of Saks Fifth Avenue could not be required to
collect Connecticut's tax even though
affiliated corporations were doing business
in state).
b. BloominQdale's By Mail, Ltd. v. Huddleston,
Tenn. Chanc. Ct. (March 8, 1991), assessments
against mail order business upheld, citing
changes in nature of business since Bellas
Hess, advent of computers to ease collection
efforts, and trash disposal burdens on
government from catalogs.
c. North Dakota v. Quill Corporation, 470 N.W.2d
203 (N.D. 1991), citing "wholesale changes"
in the economy and the law since the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Bellas Hess, 470
N.W.2d at 213, mail-order catalogue business,
which was sixth largest vendor of office
supplies in North Dakota, required to collect
a use tax from its customers.
5. The longstanding dispute was finally resolved by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Quill Corporation v.
North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 60 U.S.L.W. 4423
(1992). Quill sold office equipment and supplies
to over 3,000 customers in North Dakota. It
solicited business through catalogues, flyers,
advertisements in national periodicals and direct
telephone solicitation. It had annual sales of
approximately $1 million in that state. Although
all merchandise was delivered to North Dakota
customers by mail or common carrier from out of
state, the North Dakota statute had been amended
in 1987 to define a "retailer" responsible for
collecting the tax as "every person who engages in
the regular or systematic solicitation of a
consumer market in this state." Relying on
"changes in the legal landscape" since Complete
Auto the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
National Bellas Hess was no longer binding
precedent and affirmed the validity of its tax on
the mail-order merchant. 470 N.W.2d 203 (1991).
a. The United States Supreme Court agreed with
the North Dakota Supreme Court's analysis of
the case under the Due Process Clause. It
held that there was no question that Quill's
purposeful direction of marketing activities
in North Dakota was sufficient under the
Court's modern case authority to satisfy due
process considerations of "fair play and
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substantial justice." 112 S. Ct. at 1910,
1911, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4425.
b. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
North Dakota Court based on the Commerce
Clause. Contrasting the purposes of the two
constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court
held that the Commerce Clause was concerned
with "structural concerns about the effects
of state regulation on the national economy."
112 S. Ct. at 1919, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4426.
Thus, the Court explained that the
"substantial nexus" requirement of Complete
Auto is "a means for limiting state burdens
on interstate commerce." Id. It further
held that the "physical presence" test of
Bellas Hess provided a "bright-line" test
from which it did not wish to retreat. 112
S. Ct. at 1914. The artificiality of that
test "is more than offset by the benefits of
a clear rule." 112 S. Ct. at 1915.
c. There are two important keys to the Supreme
Court's opinion. First, the Court noted that
its decision, grounded on the Commerce
Clause, could be overruled by Congressional
legislation while a decision grounded on the
Due Process Clause could not be. Thus, the
Court seems convinced that a national
legislative solution makes the most sense.
Second, as the opinion filed by the three
concurring justices makes clear, this Court
finds increasingly important the principal of
stare decisis as a way to protect legitimate
reliance interest of government and business.
We have recently told lower courts
that "[i]f a precedent of this
Court has direct application in a
case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line
of decisions, [they] should follow
the case which directly controls,
leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own
decisions" ... It is strangely
incompatible with this to demand
that private parties anticipate our
overrulings.
112 S. Ct. at 1924, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4432
(citations omitted). In short, the
concurring opinion takes an interesting shot
at state legislatures' rush to amend their
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statutes in the hopes that the U.S. Supreme
Court would overrule on existing precedent.
6. Because of the very broad nexus provisions in many
states' sales and use tax laws, especially the
recently expanded ones, the Supreme Court's
holding in Quill has a significant practical
effect on day to day practice. The basic rule,
reaffirmed in Quill, is that the seller must have
some physical presence in the taxing state for
that state to be able to require the seller to
collect its sales and use tax. Even if all goods
are shipped from out of state, nexus for sales and
use tax purposes might be established, for
example, by an office, salesmen visiting the
state, or company trucks making regular deliveries
in the state. Depending upon local practice and
interpretation, nexus might also be established by
participation in a local trade show.
B. Income Taxes: Wisconsin Department of Revenue v.
William Wrigley, Jr. Co.
1. In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), the Supreme Court
upheld an apportioned tax on an Iowa corporation's
net income where the taxpayer's activities in the
state consisted of the solicitation of orders,
which were filled and delivered from its plant in
Iowa, and related activities (leased sales
office). That holding, which permitted taxation
based on what industry considered to be a minimal
physical presence, led to the enactment of Public
Law 86-272 (1959), codified as 15 U.S.C. § 381.
The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) No State, or political
subdivision thereof, shall have power to
impose ... a net income tax on the
income derived within such State by any
person from interstate commerce if the
only business activities within such
State by or on behalf of such person
during such taxable year are either, or
both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by
such person, or his representative,
in such State for sales of tangible
personal property, which orders are
sent outside the State for approval
or rejection, and, if approved, are
filled by shipment or delivery from
a point outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by
such person, or his representative,
in such State in the name of or for
the benefit of a prospective
customer of such person, if orders
by such customers to such person to
enable such customer to fill orders
resulting from such solicitation
are orders described in para-
graph (1).
2. The statutory protection generally applies only in
these situations:
a. Net income taxes. It does not apply, for
example, to taxes measured by gross receipts.
b. Sales of tangible personal property. The
statute does not apply, for example, to sales
of services.
c. Local activities must be limited to the
solicitation of orders which are approved or
rejected outside the taxing state.
d. The orders must be filled by shipment or
delivery from outside the taxing state.
3. Wisconsin Dept, of Rev. v. William Wrigley, Jr.,
Co., 112 S. Ct. 2447, 60 U.S.L.W. 4622 (1992).
Wrigley had an extensive sales force operating in
Wisconsin, but it had no offices there. Its
salesmen and district manager typically operated
out of their homes or occasionally had meetings in
hotels or motels. Each salesman was provided with
a company car, about $1,000 worth of gum, a supply
of display racks and promotional materials. In
addition to soliciting orders which were filled by
shipments from out of state, salesmen provided
free display racks to customers, occasionally sold
and delivered gum to be displayed in these racks,
and replaced stale gum at no cost to retailers.
In this factual context, the Supreme Court
considered two questions which it felt had been a
source of confusion in interpreting Public Law 86-
272:
The primary sources of confusion, in
this case as in others, have been two
questions: (1) what is the scope of the
crucial term "solicitation of orders";
and (2) whether there is a de minimis
exception to the activity (beyond
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"solicitation of orders") that forfeits
§ 381 immunity.
112 S. Ct. at , 60 U.S.L.W. at 4624.
4. The Supreme Court analyzed the term "solicitation"
as follows:
a. The term includes not only "explicit verbal
requests for orders, but also any speech or
conduct that implicitly invites an order."
112 S. Ct. at , 60 U.S.L.W. at 4624. It
also covers activities that neither
explicitly nor implicitly propose a sale.
b. The Court rejected the state's.position to
construe "solicitation" narrowly to include
only acts "essential" to requesting an order.
Id.
c. The Supreme Court also rejected Wrigley's
position that "solicitation" should include
any "ordinary and necessary 'business
activities' accompanying the solicitation
process" or other activities that are
"routinely associated with deploying a sales
force". 112 S. Ct. at _ , 60 U.S.L.W. at
4625.
d. Rejected the state's argument that all "post
sale" activities be excluded from
"solicitation." This hard line position
appeared unworkable in the context of a
continuing relationship involving regular
sales.
e. The test adopted by the Court turns on
whether activities serve an independent
business function apart from the solicitation
of orders.
[T]he next (and perhaps the only
other) clear line is the one
between those activities that are
entirely ancillary to requests for
purchases -- those that serve no
independent business function apart
from their connection to the
soliciting of orders -- and those
activities that the company would
have reason to engage in any way
but chooses to allocate to its in-
state sales force.
112 S. Ct. at , 60 U.S.L.W. at 4626.
5. The Supreme Court confirmed that there is a de
minimis exception applicable under Public Law 86-
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272. The test is whether the additional
connection is "trivial":
Accordingly, whether in-state activity
other than "solicitation of orders" is
sufficiently de minimis to avoid loss of
the tax immunity conferred by § 381
depends upon whether that activity
establishes a non-trivial additional
connection with the taxing State.
112 S. Ct. at , 60 U.S.L.W. at 4627.
6. Perhaps the most helpful part of the Supreme
Court's opinion is its identification of
particular activities that do and do not result in
loss of tax immunity under the statute.
a. According to a majority of the Court, the
following activities were not "ancillary" to
the solicitation of orders by Wrigley and
therefore were not protected under the
statute:
i. Replacement of stale gum, an activity
that serves a business purpose
independent of soliciting new orders.
ii. Supplying gum, for a fee, to be used in
display cases. The fact that the gum
was sold showed that there was a purpose
for providing it to customers
independent from soliciting new orders.
iii. Storing in Wisconsin the gum that was
used to "swap" for stale gum and sell
for display racks.
iv. Employing salesmen to repair or service
the company's products.
b. The Court expressly noted that the following
activities by Wrigley were protected under
the statute:
i. Recruiting, training and evaluating
sales representatives.
ii. Using hotels and homes for sales related
meetings.
iii. Resolving credit disputes between
customers and the "home office."
iv. Providing cars to sales personnel.
v. Driving within the state and spending
nights in hotel rooms.
vi. Displaying product samples.
c. The Court makes clear that maintaining an
office in state, without more, will subject
the taxpayer to income taxation:
Even if engaged in exclusively to
facilitate requests or purchases,
the maintenance of an office within
the State, by the company or on its
behalf, would go beyond the
"solicitation of orders." We would
not make any more generalized
exception to our immunity standard
on the basis of the "office"
provision. It seemingly represents
a judgment that a company office
within a State is such a
significant manifestation of
company "presence" that, absent a
specific exemption, income taxation
should always be allowed.
112 S. Ct. at , 60 U.S.L.W. at 4626.
Note, however, that this per se rule does not
apply if the office is maintained by
independent contractors. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 381(c).
7. The Court's conclusion that Wrigley's activities
did not come within the de minimis exception to
the statute makes questionable the viability of
this argument in future cases. The amount of gum
provided by Wrigley salesmen amounted to only
0.00007% of its sales in Wisconsin. However, the
Court, declined to view any of these non-immune
activities in isolation. Instead, viewing them in
toto, it concluded that they were not a "non-
trivial additional connection with the state."
112 S. Ct. at , 60 U.S.L.W. at 4628.
We need not decide whether any of the
non-immune activities were de minimis in
isolation; taken together, they clearly
are not. Wrigley's sales
representatives exchanged stale gum, as
a matter of regular company policy, on a
continuing basis, and Wrigley maintained
a stock of gum worth several thousand
dollars in the State for this purpose as
well as for the less frequently pursued
(but equally unprotected) purpose of
selling gum through "agency stock
checks." Although the relative
magnitude of these activities was not
large compared to Wrigley's other
operations in Wisconsin, we have little
difficulty concluding that they
constitute a non-trivial additional
connection with the State.
112 S. Ct. at __ , 60 U.S.L.W. at 4628.
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8. Although less than the complete victory sought by
industry, the Supreme Court's decision in Wrigley
should put an end to the narrow interpretation of
Public Law 86-272 applied by many states. In
addition, it establishes a number of bright lines
as to what a taxpayer should and should not do if
it wishes to take advantage of the statutory
immunity. Definite "do not dos" are: maintain an
office or store goods in the taxing state or
provide follow-up "repair and servicing" to
customers.
IV. Apportionment of Unitary Business Income
A. Formulary Apportionment
1. There are two ways commonly used to determine the
amount of income earned in a particular state:
"transactional" or "geographical" accounting and
"formulary apportionment."
a. Under the transactional accounting method,
income and expenses are determined based on
geographic origin, with arm's-length pricing
standards used to adjust for intercompany
transactions. Although the apparent
accounting standard of business and industry,
tax collectors see this system as subject to
abuse.
One way of deriving locally taxable
income is on the basis of formal
geographical or transactional
accounting. The problem with this
method is that formal accounting is
subject to manipulation and
imprecision, and often ignores or
inadequately captures the many
subtle and largely unquantifiable
transfers of value that take place
among the components of a single
enterprise.
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165 (1983).
[T]he Court has noted that separate
accounting, while it purports to
isolate portions of income received
in various States, may fail to
account for contributions to income
resulting from functional
integration, centralization of
management, and economies of scale.
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S.
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at 508-509. Because these factors
of profitability arise from the
operation of the business as s
whole, it becomes misleading to
characterize the income of the
business as having a single
identifiable "source." Although
separate geographical accounting
may be useful for internal
auditing, for purposes of state
taxation it is not constitutionally
required. Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont,
445 U.S. 425, 438 (1988).
b. Because of the uncertainties inherent in
geographical accounting, particularly when
dealing with complex multi-state and
international corporate structures, most
states utilize so-called "formulary
apportionment" under which the total income
of the corporate entity is apportioned among
the states where it does business based on a
formula. The most common formula uses three
factors derived from property, payroll and
sales. See Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act, 7A U.L.A. 331 (1985).
2. Formulary apportionment rests on the premise that
all the various elements of a "unitary business"
contribute to the profits of the whole. In
simplest terms, whether there is a unitary
business depends upon an analysis of three
"factors of profitability":
a. Functional integration.
b. Centralized management.
c. Economies of scale.
E.g., F. W. Woolworth v. Taxation & Rev. Dept.,
458 U.S. 354, 364 (1982).
3. The key to formulary apportionment, the unitary
business concept is found in a number of different
contexts:
a. Treating the separate, unitary divisions of a
single corporation as an entity for purposes
of determining income subject to taxation by
apportionment. E.q., Commonwealth of
Virginia v. Lucky Stores, 225 S.E.2d 870 (Va.
1976).
b. Taxing members of an affiliated group of
unitary corporations in a single, combined
return. E , Container Corp. of America v.
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Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983);
Commonwealth of Virginia v. General Electric
Company, 372 S.E.2d 599 (Va. 1988) (combining
parent and wholly owned DISC).
c. Including in apportionable income dividends
received from unitary subsidiaries. Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of
Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
4. Among the states that require unitary affiliates
to file a "combined" return, there are two
different approaches: "world-wide combination"
and the "waters edge" approach. Under "world-wide
combination" the state determines taxable income
based on formulary apportionment as applied to the
world-wide income of all members of the corporate
group engaged in a unitary business. The "waters
edge" excludes from the combined return foreign
corporations that are members of the corporate
group but that do no business in the United
States. Because of the extraordinary accounting
and compliance burdens world-wide combination
places on businesses, this form of taxation has
been particularly controversial.
a. California's world-wide combination approach
was approved in Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) when
applied to a group the parent of which was a
domestic corporation. In finding the
requisite "unitary business," the United
States Supreme Court noted the deference
generally paid to state courts'
determinations, and that the burden of
disproving the existence of a unitary
relationship is on the taxpayer. 463 U.S. at
175. The court also adopted an analysis
focusing on the "flow of value" between
members of a multicorporate group to
determine the existence of a unitary
business. 463 U.S. at 178.
b. Following the decision in Container Corp.,
the open question was whether the Foreign
Commerce Clause would produce a different
result in the case of a corporate group the
parent of which was not a U.S. corporation.
i. In Franchise Tax Board v. Alcan
Aluminum, Limited, 493 U.S. 331 (1990),
rehearing denied, 494 U.S. 1012 (1990),
the United States Supreme Court struck
down the attempt of a foreign
corporation whose domestic subsidiary
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did business in California to challenge
that state's world-wide combination
methodology in federal court. As a
general proposition, the "Tax Injunction
Act", 28 U.S.C. § 1341, generally bars
resolution of state tax issues in
federal court so long as there is an
adequate state remedy available. Such
cases also raise questions of "comity"
and federal state relations.
ii. Subsequent to the decision in Alcan
Aluminum, the California courts struck
down various challenges to the world-
wide combination method. See Barkley's
Bank Int'l Limited v. Franchise Tax
Board, 829 P.2d 279 (1992) (foreign-
parent); Colgate-Palmolive Company v.
Franchise Tax Board, 284 Cal. Rptr. 780
(1991) (domestic parent).
iii. For an interesting discussion of world-
wide unitary taxation, see Hellerstein,
Are Days of World-Wide Unitary Taxation
by States Limited?, 72 J.Tax 172 (March
1990). Notwithstanding the recent
litigation reverses of taxpayers in
California courts, Professor Hellerstein
notes in his article:
Indeed, the real war over world-
wide unitary combination, whether
involving domestic or foreign
parents, was effectively waged and
won by the multi-nationals in state
legislatures across the country
following the CONTAINER decision.
Between 1983 and 1989, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida,
Idaho, Indiana, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon,
and Utah endorsed a waters edge
approach to the unitary business
principle, and only Alaska
apparently still adheres to a
policy of world-wide unitary
combination.
72, J. Tax at 176.
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V. Limits on Apportionability: The Discrete Business Enterprise
A. Unitary Business -- The Linchpin of Apportionability
1. Where the unitary business concept has provided
the basis for taxation by formulary apportionment
and combined returns, it has also provided a
limitation on states' taxing powers. In upholding
Vermont's apportioned tax on income including
dividends from foreign unitary subsidiaries, the
Supreme Court made the now famous statement "the
linchpin of apportionability in the field of state
income taxation is the unitary business
principle." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980).
Focusing, however, on the requirement of the Due
Process Clause that there be a "minimal
connection" between the interstate activities and
the taxing state, the Court went on to state:
Where the business activities of the
dividend payor have nothing to do with
the activities of the recipient in the
taxing State, due process considerations
might well preclude apportionability,
because there would be no underlying
unitary business.
445 U.S. at 442. The issue is whether the income
derive[s] from "unrelated business activity"
id. at 442, which constitutes a "discrete
business enterprise." Id. at 439. See also,
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev., 447
U.S. 209, 224 (1980) (Exxon's marketing and
other departments part of unitary business
and not "discrete business enterprises").
The form of investment (e.g., corporation,
division, partnership) or form of income is
not controlling. Id. at 440-41.
One must look principally at the
underlying activity, not at the form of
investment, to determine the propriety
of apportionability.
Id. at 440.
B. ASARCO
1. Following through with its warnings in Mobil Oil,
the Supreme Court overturned Idaho's attempt to
include in ASARCO's apportionable income certain
dividend, interest and capital gain income it
received from investments in five foreign
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corporations. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 459 U.S. 961 (1982). Although Asarco and
the five corporations were all engaged in various
aspects of the same industry (mining), the Court
concluded that they were not engaged in a unitary
business because various agreements limited
ASARCO's control over the "affiliates" and
required transactions to be conducted on an arm's
length standard. Since there was no unitary
relationship, the court concluded that the five
investments were "discrete business enterprises"
within the meaning of Mobil Oil and Exxon.
2. Notwithstanding a strong dissenting opinion by
Justice O'Conner, a majority of the Court,
speaking through Justice Powell, rejected Idaho's
position that income from intangibles was unitary
if the intangibles contribute to or relate in any
way to furtherance of the taxpayer's trade or
business. According to Justice Powell, such a
reading of the unitary business principle would
destroy the concept.
This definition of unitary business
would destroy the concept. The business
of a corporation requires that it earn
money to continue operations and to
provide a return on its invested
capital. Consequently all of its
operations, including any investments
made, in some sense can be said to be
"for purposes related to or contributing
to the [corporation's] business" when
pressed to its logical limit, this
conception of the "unitary business"
limitation becomes no limitation at all.
458 U.S. at 326.
3. Following the Supreme Court's decision in ASARCO,
state courts reached conflicting results as taxing
authorities tried to avoid imposing the unitary
business concept as a limit on full
apportionability.
a. ASARCO was applied literally in the following
cases:
i. James v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 654
S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1983).
ii. American Home Products Corp. v. Limbach,
551 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio), cert. denied 111
S. Ct. 63 (1990).
iii. Corning Glass Works v. Virginia
Department of Taxation, 402 S.E.2d 35
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(1991). Because Corning Glass Works was
prohibited by terms of antitrust consent
decree from exercising any control over
or influencing management of its 50%
investment in Owens Corning Fiberglass,
there was no unitary relationship
between payor and payee. Accordingly,
state's attempt to tax a portion of the
capital gain recognized upon sale of
stock in subsidiary invalid.
b. ASARCO was distinguished in the following
cases:
i. N. Lowenstein Corp. v. South Carolina
Tax Comm'n, 378 S.E.2d 272 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1989). Short-term loans of working
capital, with possible unitary
relationship between payor and payee.
ii. Lone Star Steel Co. v. Dolan, 668 P.2d
916 (Colo. 1983). Short-term loans to
parent corporation, with principal and
interest used to meet short-term
business needs.
iii. Silent Hoist & Crane Co., Inc. v.
Director, Div. of Taxation, 494 A.2d 775
(N.J. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995
(1985). Single corporation operating in
divisions had income from manufacturing
and from investments. Fact that there
was one chief executive officer who
directed all company activities, one set
of accounting records and one bank
account showed unitary nature of
business.
iv. Comptroller v. Armco, Inc., 521 A.2d 785
(Md. App. 1987). Reasoning that ASARCO
must be limited to its precise facts,
court determined that taxation can be
supported if income is earned as part of
the unitary business of the payee
conducted in-state. Case returned to
Tax Court to determine if interest
received was unrelated to Armco's
Maryland business operations.
v. Comptroller v. NCR Corp., 524 A.2d 93
(Md. App. 1987). Surplus funds invested
in short-term investments issued by
nonunitary payers. Following Armco,
income held to be taxable by
apportionment since income derived from
unitary business operations and were
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available to support unitary business
operations in Maryland.
4. Various commentators found a literal application
of the requirement that there be a unitary
relationship between the payor and payee to be
unworkable in certain situations. For example:
a. When the payee corporation is, for example,
an investment firm whose income derives from
its investments in other corporations. Cf.
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,
350 U.S. 46 (1955).
b. Interest received from bank accounts or other
investments providing short-term operating
capital for the business.
C. ASARCO Means What It Says: Allied-Siqnal Inc. v.
Director
1. The dispute as to the meaning of ASARCO was
resolved in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div.
of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 60 U.S.L.W. 4554
(June 15, 1992). Bendix Corporation, the
predecessor in interest to Allied-Signal, held
20.6% of the stock in ASARCO. Bendix was engaged
primarily in manufacturing while ASARCO was a
mining company. When Bendix sold its stock back
to ASARCO, New Jersey asserted its right to tax,
by full apportionment, part of the $211.5 million
gain recognized by Bendix. The parties, however,
had stipulated as follows in the trial court:
a. Bendix and ASARCO were unrelated business
enterprises each of whose activities had
nothing to do with the other. 112 S. Ct. at
2256, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4555.
b. None of the business activities of ASARCO
were involved with those of Bendix, and none
of the business activities of Bendix were
involved with those of ASARCO. Id.
c. None of the many factors traditionally
related to a "unitary business" existed. For
example, Bendix and ASARCO had no common
management, did not lend money to each other,
did not lend employees to each other, and did
not sell product to each other. 112 S. Ct.
at 2256-57.
2. The New Jersey Supreme Court had affirmed the
taxation of the gain recognized by Bendix by
focusing on the use to which Bendix put those
funds. Bendix Corp. v. Director, Div. of
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Taxation, 592 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1991). It noted that
Bendix had a long time company policy of corporate
acquisitions and divestitures. It further noted
that the proceeds from the sale of ASARCO stock
were intended to be used in an unsuccessful bid to
acquire another member of the aerospace industry
whose activity would likely have been unitary with
those of Bendix' aerospace/electronics businesses.
112 S. Ct. at 2257, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4556.
3. After requesting the parties to brief specially
various questions, including whether the unitary
business theory remained an appropriate device for
determining whether a state "has transgressed its
constitutional limitations", the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous decision in
ASARCO. Justice Kennedy stated:
New Jersey's basic theory is that multi-
state corporations like Bendix regard
all their holdings as pools of assets,
used for maximum long-term
profitability, and that any distinction
between operational and investment
assets is artificial. We may assume,
arguendo, that the managers of Bendix
cared most about the profits entry on a
financial statement, but that state of
mind sheds little light on the question
whether in pursuing maximum profits they
treated particular intangible assets as
serving, on the one hand, an investment
function, or, on the other, an
operational function.... That is the
relevant unitary business inquiry, one
which focuses on the objective
characteristics of the asset's use and
its relation to the taxpayer and the
activities within the taxing state.
112 S. Ct. at 2261-62, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4558. The
Court rejected the reading of ASARCO that one must
show a unitary relationship between payor and
payee as a prerequisite to taxation by
apportionment. The test offered by Justice
Kennedy was summarized, a second time, as follows:
What is required instead is that the
capital transaction serve an operational
rather than an investment function.
112 S. Ct. at 2263, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4558.
4. Under the Court's opinion, the following
situations will support taxation by apportionment:
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a. A unitary relationship between payee and
payor "is. one justification for
apportionment, but not the only one." Id.
b. Interest earned on short-term deposits if
that income forms part of the working capital
of the unitary business.
C. Although not addressed in the Court's
opinion, investments which provide the payee
corporation a source of supply or other
market advantages would seemingly satisfy
Justice Kennedy's test of serving an
"operational rather than an investment
function."
5. Based on the stipulation of the parties, the
Supreme Court held that New Jersey had illegally
subjected to tax the capital gain recognized by
Bendix upon its sale of ASARCO stock. Based on
the stipulations, there was no unitary
relationship between Bendix and ASARCO. Moreover,
there was nothing in the facts to suggest that
Bendix' investment was analogous to short-term
working capital. The fact that the investment
served a business function, such as making a
profit, was irrelevant. Moreover, the intended
use of the proceeds from the sale of stock
provided no relevant indication that the stock
served an operational function and not an
investment one.
6. Note that the ASARCO and Allied SiQnal principle
applies to virtually any type of investment
income: dividends, interest, capital gains, and
royalties. Even in a UDITPA state, the
classification of any of these items as "business
income" does not necessarily satisfy the Due
Process concerns. That argument was rejected both
in ASARCO and Allied Signal. Thus, the two-part
analysis indicated in Justice Kennedy's opinion
should be applied to any type of investment income
to determine taxability by a corporation's
nondomiciliary state. That two-part test is:
a. Is there a unitary relationship between the
payor and payee corporations?
b. Even if there is not a unitary relationship,
does the investment serve an operational
function?
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VI. Fair Apportionment and Factor Relief
A. The Tests of Fair Apportionment
1. There are two tests to determine whether a state's
apportionment formula is constitutionally fair.
See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 169 (1983).
a. The first test is the "internal consistency"
test.
"[T]he formula must be such that, is
applied by every jurisdiction, it would
result in no more than all of the
unitary business' income being taxed."
Id.
b. The second test is the external consistency
test. Under this test "the factor or factors
used in the apportionment formula must
actually reflect a reasonable sense of how
income is generated." Id.
B. Justice Stevens' Dissent in Mobil
1. To be ideally fair, an apportionment formula must
reflect the income being taxed. For this obvious
reason, formulas which apportion to a particular
state a part of a corporation's income relate in-
state activities (e.g., property, payroll and
sales) to the corporation's total activities.
Problems can arise when there is no such
correlation.
2. Justice Stevens' dissent in Mobil provided a road
map for fair apportionment litigation during the
next decade. Although a majority of the Court
affirmed Vermont's inclusion of dividends from
foreign subsidiaries in Mobil's apportionable tax
base, Justice Stevens' dissent notes that
Vermont's apportionment formula did not make the
correlative adjustments necessary to produce a
fair result.
But of greatest importance, the record
contains no information about the
payrolls, sales or property values of
any of those corporations, and Vermont
has made no attempt to incorporate them
into the apportionment formula
computations. Unless the sales,
payroll, and property values connected
with the production of income by the
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payor corporations are added to the
denominator of the apportionment
formula, the inclusion of earnings
attributable to those corporations in
the apportionable tax base will
inevitably cause Mobil's Vermont income
to be overstated.
Either Mobil's world-wide "petroleum
enterprise" ... is all part of one
unitary business, or it is not; if it
is, Vermont must evaluate the entire
enterprise in a consistent manner.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of
Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 460-61 (J. Stevens,
dissenting).
C. Fair Apportionment Cases
1. American Tel. & Tel. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev.,
422 N.W.2d 629 (Wis. App. 1988). State's formula
apportioned income from AT&T's subsidiaries based
solely on factors of the entity doing business in
Wisconsin. That entity's Wisconsin factors were
much larger than the Wisconsin factors of the
entire corporate group. The resulting tax failed
the external consistency test. "[T]he taxes which
Wisconsin exacts from AT&T are grossly
disproportionate to the benefits conferred." Id.
422 N.W.2d at 636.
2. NCR Corporation, a manufacturer, conducts its
business outside the United States through foreign
branches and subsidiaries. It receives dividends,
interest and royalties from these unitary
subsidiaries. Although taxes are paid by the
subsidiaries to foreign governments, many states
include income from the subsidiaries in NCR's
apportionable income without providing any
correlative adjustments to the apportionment
formula. There are three NCR "factor relief"
cases:
a. NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 544 A.2d 764 (Md.
1988). With respect to dividends, the
Maryland Court of Appeals determined that
"NCR is correct in asserting that the
formula, as applied to it, does not produce
ideally fair results." 544 A.2d at 780. The
case was remanded to Tax Court to determine
if "the existing distortion is so grossly
disproportionate that it is
unconstitutional." Id. at 780.
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b. NCR Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 438
N.W.2d 86 (Minn. 1989). Minnesota's
apportionment formula upheld on the grounds
that the result was not so grossly
disproportionate as to rise to level of
constitutional significance.
c. NCR Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Commn., 402
S.E.2d 666 (S.C. 1991). Following the
Maryland Court of Appeals' analysis, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina agreed that
there were potential problems with the
apportionment formula. The case was remanded
to determine if the problems rose to a level
of constitutional significance:
[W]e remand this case to the lower
court for a re-factoring of the
formula, considering in the formula
denominator the proportionate
measure[s] ... of the foreign
subsidiaries' property, payroll,
and sales which generated the NCR
income. Once this is done, the new
tax amount should be figured and
compared with the tax amount
presently assessed against NCR by
the Tax Commission. If the trial
court finds there is a gross
disparity between the two amounts
of constitutional proportions, it
shall order the new tax amount to
be assessed and refund granted. If
no gross distortion exists upon a
comparison of the tax amounts, the
original tax assessed against NCR
shall stand and NCR shall not be
entitled to any refund. 402 S.E.2d
at 674.
3. Tambrands, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 595 A.2d
1039 (Me. 1991). Dividends received from foreign
affiliates were included in apportionable income
without making any correlative adjustment to the
three factor apportionment formula. The Supreme
Court of Maine held that the assessment was
constitutionally flawed because it lacked internal
consistency. If Maine was to include in
Tambrands' apportionable tax base income from
affiliates operating abroad, it could not
apportion that income by factors reflecting only
Tambrands' domestic operations. 595 A.2d at 1044.
Case remanded to assessor "to include additional
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factors in the apportionment formula that will
'fairly represent' Tambrands' business activity"
in Maine. Id. at 1045.
VII. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
A. Discriminatory Taxes Prohibited
1. Under Complete Auto a tax will not survive
Commerce Clause challenge if it discriminates
against interstate commerce. The discrimination
is invalid if it either provides a benefit to in-
state business that is not provided to others or
if it produces a burden on out-of-state business
that is not borne by in-state businesses.
2. The following recent decisions illustrate this
rule against discriminatory taxation of interstate
commerce:
a. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n,
429 U.S. 318 (1977). New York law was struck
down because it imposed a higher tax on
transfers of stock occurring outside that
state than on transfers involving sales
within that state.
b. Armco v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984). West
Virginia's gross receipts tax on wholesale
merchants was invalidated as applied to an
Ohio manufacturer. West Virginia
manufacturers, who paid a tax on
manufacturing receipts, were exempt from the
tax on wholesalers; but the same exemption
was not available to the Ohio manufacturer.
Actual proof of discriminatory impact was not
required because, viewed together, the taxes
on manufacturing and wholesaling failed the
internal consistency test of Container Corp..
c. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263
(1984). Hawaii's excise tax on wholesales of
liquor held invalid because two locally
produced products were exempted from the tax.
Neither the twenty-first amendment nor
legislative purpose to help a new, struggling
industry could justify the illegal
discrimination.
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B. Kraft General Foods v. Iowa DeRartment of Revenue
1. Kraft General Foods v. Iowa Dept. of Rev., 112 S.
Ct. 2365, 60 U.S.L.W. 4582 (1992) reviewed
discrimination resulting from the fact that Iowa's
corporate income tax basically followed the
federal definition of "net income". As a result,
Iowa's definition of taxable income excluded
dividends received from domestic subsidiaries but
not dividends received from foreign subsidiaries.
Unlike the federal tax laws, Iowa provided no
credit for taxes paid to foreign countries.
2. The United States Supreme Court held that Iowa's
taxing scheme violated the Foreign Commerce
Clause, even though Iowa's tax in no way favored
local commerce. Iowa's subsidiaries were not more
favorably treated than subsidiaries located
elsewhere. When dealing with foreign commerce,
such local preference or benefit is not necessary.
So here, we think that a State's
preference for domestic commerce over
foreign commerce is inconsistent with
the Commerce Clause even if the State's
own economy is not a direct beneficiary
of the discrimination. As the absence
of local benefit does not eliminate the
international implications of the
discrimination, it cannot exempt such
discrimination from commerce clause
prohibitions.
112 S. Ct. at , 60 U.S.L.W. at 4584-4585.
3. According to Ernst & Young, ten other states have
laws which suffer the same defect as Iowa's taxing
scheme:
Ten other states discriminate against
foreign-source dividends in a manner
similar to Iowa. New Mexico, Vermont,
and Pennsylvania have enacted tax
schemes identical to Iowa's. Colorado,
Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, and South Carolina have adopted
similar schemes, but with modification.
Alabama and the District of Columbia do
not follow the federal scheme, but
nevertheless discriminate against
foreign-source dividends. Taxpayers in
these states should consider filing
refund claims.
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Evans, Gasaway & Linford, The States' Power To Tax
-- A Review of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1991-1992
Term, State Tax Notes 931 (June 29, 1992).
C. Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt
1. In Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct.
2009, 60 U.S.L.W. 4433 (1992), the United States
Supreme Court dealt with one of the current hot
political potatoes of state and local government -
- the disposal of solid waste material, especially
hazardous waste material. Alabama adopted a two
tier tax structure affecting operators of
hazardous waste landfills. A "base fee' of $25.60
per ton applied to all hazardous waste, and an
"additional fee" of $72 per ton applied to
hazardous waste "generated outside of Alabama and
disposed of ... in Alabama." 112 S. Ct. at 2012,
60 U.S.L.W. at 4434. The Alabama Supreme Court
upheld the validity of this facially
discriminatory fee arguing that it advanced
legitimate local purposes relating to the health
and safety of the state's citizens.
2. The United States Supreme Court reversed. A
statute which produces "facial discrimination
invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported
legitimate local purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives." 112 S. Ct. at
2014. The flaw in the Alabama scheme was that the
hazardous waste produced outside Alabama was no
more dangerous than hazardous waste produced
inside the state. Thus, the statute discriminated
based solely on the interstate origin of the
waste. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court
found that there were less discriminatory
alternatives to the State such as a higher per ton
fee applicable to all hazardous waste material or
a per-mile tax on vehicles transporting hazardous
waste materials across Alabama roads. So viewed,
the Court found the additional fee to be "'an
obvious effort to settle those outside the state'
with most of the burden of slowing the flow of
waste into the [Alabama] facility." 112 S. Ct. at
2016.
.3. The Court did not consider arguments that the
"additional fee' makes out-of-state generators pay
their "fair share" of costs incurred by the state
or that the additional fee was justified as a
"compensatory tax." 112 S. Ct. at 2016, n. 9.
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D. Florida's Intangibles Tax
1. The United States Supreme Court, without opinion,
has let stand the decision of the Florida District
Court of Appeal upholding the validity of that
state's intangibles tax against challenges under
the Commerce Clause. See Ford Motor Credit
Company v. Department of Rev., 111 S. Ct. 2049
(1991). There was no opinion of the United States
Supreme Court. Its order indicates that the
judgment below was "affirmed by an equally divided
Court." Justice O'Conner took no part in the
decision.
2. Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC) attacked the
Florida intangibles tax arguing that it failed the
internal consistency test of Container Corp.. The
Florida statute treats as taxable any intangibles
either (i) "arising out of, or issued in
connection with, the sale, leasing or servicing of
real or personal property in the state" or (ii)
intangibles owned by a domiciliary corporation.
If all states apply this dual nexus standard, then
FMCC and other interstate businesses will be
subject to double taxation: once in the states
where its loans originate and once in the state of
its corporate domicile. The Florida Court of
Appeal, however, held that the internal
consistency test had been applied by the United
States Supreme Court only in income and franchise
tax cases and never in a property tax case. It
also held that the Florida taxing scheme did not
discriminate against interstate commerce by
affording an undue advantage to local business.
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Department of Rev., 537
So.2d 1011 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1988).
VIII. Cost Based Property Taxes
A. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County
1. For more than ten years, one West Virginia
locality valued property based on "the declared
consideration at which the property last sold."
488 U.S. at 338. Only minor adjustments to this
value were made in subsequent years. Under this
system, owners of newly acquired property were
assessed at substantially higher values than were
owners of substantially identical properties which
had not transferred recently. The plaintiff coal
companies were assessed at 8 - 35 times higher
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than comparable properties in the county. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held
that the assessor's actions did not constitute
"intentional and systematic" discrimination and,
even if they did, the plaintiffs' remedy was to
have the values of other property owners
increased. 488 U.S. at 342.
2. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the assessments on the coal companies'
property violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment which protects
individuals from being subjected to taxes not
imposed on others in the same class. Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U.S.
336 (1989). The assessments in question could not
be defended on a rational classification basis
because the West Virginia Constitution requires
all taxes to be uniformly assessed at fair market
value. Thus, no classification argument was
available to the assessor as a matter of state
law.
B. Proposition 13
1. The holding in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
immediately drew into question the validity of the
property taxing system employed following
California's adoption of Proposition 13.
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 60 U.S.L.W.
4563 (1992). Under that system, property is
appraised at its "full cash value," defined as its
assessed value in 1975 or its value in any year
thereafter when the real property is purchased,
newly constructed, or has a change in ownership.
Annual increases in value over the "full cash
value" are limited to the lesser of inflation or
two percent. The California Court of Appeals
upheld the validity of the "acquisition value"
system imposed by Proposition 13 arguing that it
was supported by at least two rational bases.
Nordlinger v. Lynch, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684, 691-692
(1990).
2. The United States Supreme Court affirmed,
upholding the validity of California's acquisition
value assessment system. Unlike West Virginia,
the California Constitution does not require
uniform assessments based on current market
values. This fact opened the way for the taxing
authorities to assert that there were legitimate
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state interests supporting its assessment system;
for example, protecting property owners from being
driven out of their homes by increased taxes and
preserving local neighborhoods.
C. Welcome Stranger Taxes After Nordlinger
1. The fate of California's Proposition 13 may not
yet have been finally decided. Because the
plaintiff in Nordlinger was an individual, she
could not raise certain constitutional objections
available to corporations. For example, a case
originally filed by R.H. Macy & Co. but dropped in
favor of letting Nordlinger proceed raised the
question of validity under the Commerce Clause.
The argument there is that an acquisition value
system discriminates against interstate commerce
because it subjects out-of-state corporations
locating in California to higher property taxes
than are assessed against existing corporations.
2. It is not unusual to find an acquisition value
system employed to assess tangible personal
property, machinery, equipment, etc. In a state
with constitutional standards requiring
assessments to be uniform and at fair market
value, is an "original cost" assessment system
valid under Nordlinger? What if the "original
cost" is changed whenever the property is sold?
For example, in an asset acquisition, one owner
may buy personal property from another for the
express purpose of obtaining a higher cost basis
for federal income tax purposes. The property
will be used thereafter in the same business. If
the locality assesses that property at the new
federal tax cost basis, it will be assessing the
identical property owned by substantially
identical taxpayers at substantially different
values.
IX. Availability of Retroactive Refunds
A. Previous Retroactivity Cases
1. The United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1971) set forth a
three part inquiry for determining whether a
decision of the United States Supreme Court will
be given effect only prospectively.
a. Does the decision establish a new principle
of law, either by overruling clear past
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precedent or by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed.
b. Will applying the new rule retroactively
further or retard the operation of the rule
in question?
c. Will retroactive application of the new rule
produce substantial inequitable results?
2. Various states seized upon the three part Chevron
test to deny refunds to parties which had
successfully contested the validity of
unconstitutional taxes. Since some of the
circumstances in which refunds were denied were
questionable, at best, the issue of retroactive
refunds became a source of great tension between
taxpayers and state taxing authorities.
a. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S.
167 (1990). Four justices of the United
States Supreme Court, with Justice Scalia
concurring on other grounds, ruled that the
taxpayers were not entitled to refunds of
taxes collected prior to the date of an
earlier case which effected a "change of
law." The four justices relied on the
Chevron test to support not making
retroactive refunds.
b. McKesson v. Florida Alcohol & Tobacco Div.,
496 U.S. 18 (1990). Notwithstanding the
United States Supreme Court decision in
Bacchus declaring a substantially identical
Hawaii tax invalid, Florida enacted a tax on
wholesale liquor distributors providing rate
reductions for certain local products.
Citing certain "equitable considerations",
the Florida Supreme Court declined to grant
retroactive refunds. The United States
Supreme Court reversed. In a unanimous
opinion, the Court held that:
When a State penalizes taxpayers
for failure to remit their taxes in
timely fashion, thus requiring them
to pay first before obtaining
review of the tax's validity,
federal due process principles long
recognized by our cases require the
state's postdeprivation procedure
to provide a "clear and certain
remedy" ... for the deprivation of
tax monies in an unconstitutional
manner.
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496 U.S. at 51. The case was remanded to the
Florida courts to determine the exact form of
relief to be provided, so long as that relief
was meaningful and satisfied minimum federal
requirements.
B. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia
1. The retroactivity issue left open by the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in McKesson and
American Trucking seemed to come to a conclusion
in yet another case involving retroactive refunds
based on Bacchus. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). Once again,
however, no five justices were able to agree on a
single opinion.
a. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens,
concluded that refunds must be retroactively
granted because they had been granted to-the
litigants in Bacchus. "[W]hen the Court has
applied a rule of law to the litigants in one
case it must do so with respect to all others
not barred by procedural requirements or res
judicata." 111 S. Ct. at 2448.
b. Justice White concurred in the judgment of
the Court but expressly declined to endorse
any views Justice Souter might have expressed
about the viability of the Chevron test.
c. Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Scalia
concurred in the judgment of the Court based
on their view that a constitutional decision
can never be applied prospectively only.
d. Justices O'Conner and Kennedy and Chief
Justice Reinquist dissented. Relying on the
Chevron test, they would not have permitted
retroactive refunds.
2. The position of the United States Supreme Court on
the availability of a "prospective only" defense
to states in denying refunds remains uncertain
even after James Beam. Four justices appear to be
committed to application of the Chevron test to
determine whether refunds will be granted
retroactively. Three current justices of the
Court appear to be committed to the concept that
changes in constitutional decision must be applied
retroactively. Justice Souter appears to join
this later group of three, thereby making the
Court evenly divided. The views of Justice
Thomas, who was appointed to the Court after the
decision in James Beam, are not yet known.
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3. The retroactivity issue may be finally decided by
the appeals now pending in the United States
Supreme Court in the Federal Pension Cases. In
Davis v. Michigan Dep. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803
(1989) the United States Supreme Court held that a
state's failure to exempt from tax pensions of
federal retirees was unconstitutional when such an
exemption was granted to state retirees.
a. Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,
401 S.E.2d 868, vacated and remanded for
reconsideration in light of James Beam, aff'd
410 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 1991). The Commonwealth
of Virginia has declined refund of
approximately one-half billion dollars to
federal retirees relying on application of
the Chevron test.
b. Others? [South Carolina, North Carolina,
Kansas]
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